Introduction
The original treaties establishing first the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952 and then in 1957 both the European Atomic Energy Community and the European Economic its potential for global projection. Michael Smith, for example, has written on the need to reassess ideas of power and international actorness 11 . He argues, for example, that the EU"s Common Commercial Policy and its impact upon global trade agreements, has far greater foreign policy significance than analysts properly credit. Similarly, of course, the EU"s Common Agricultural Policy has far greater effect upon the developing world than the impact of all the coordinated political declarations issued by EU Member States on the developing world. Indeed, a persuasive case is made in favour of viewing of the Union"s own enlargement policy as being its most significant foreign policy contribution to peace in the 21 st Century. 12 Others have assessed the EU"s approach to key strategic regions such as the While these approaches offer a necessary corrective to an unhealthy preoccupation with "high politics", they still underscore the reality that the EU"s international coherence and effectiveness relies upon a balance between different policy tools and an effective decisionmaking structure. That structure, however, has not developed as originally foreseen -that is to say increasingly shared political interests being pursued through a set of common supranational institutions. Instead, Member States have created a parallel structure to deal with explicitly "foreign" policy issues. As the pressures increased -most notably from third parties -to see the EC take a more visible international stand on the major issues of the day, the Member States responded by developing an intergovernmental policy structure that excluded the supranational institutions (Commission, Parliament and Court of Justice) and which was devised outside the parameters of the founding EC treaties. Even in those areas where orthodox Community rules continued to be applied, such as trade and economics, Member States proved themselves surprisingly adept at resisting efforts either to relate these to explicit foreign policy goalsor even to extend Community competence to associated issues, such as intellectual property rights and trade in certain service sectors. In 1970 the Member States of the European Communities established a procedure for the coordination of specific, agreed foreign policy positions. European Political Cooperation (EPC), as this procedure was called, was created outside the ambit of the Community"s institutions and law and was based upon an explicitly intergovernmental base. It was not until the 1986 Single European Act that the basic infrastructure of EPC was set out in a formal treaty text. Even then, it was provided for within a very distinct Title of the SEA treaty, and was agreed among the "High Contracting Parties" rather than among the "Member States" of other treaty provisions. In form and content therefore, EPC appeared to be precisely the kind of interest-driven, Member State controlled procedure that intergovernmentalists would have expected to see ascribed to the realm of foreign policy cooperation. 16 Witnessing the apparent stagnation of the European project in the late 1970s some analysts saw the stubborn strength of intergovernmental interests -exemplified in EPC -as the best possible illustration that state interests were the true driving force behind the European integrative project, which was itself the complex product of a simple 'convergence of national interests'. 17 The EU"s institutional superstructure could then be seen as the matrix within which an especially complex system of interstate bargaining would then take place and through which the cooperative benefits of such interstate bargaining would be distributed.
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Analysts could also point to empirical case studies where the dominance of state interests in the construction of a "common" European position could be clearly seen where the interests of the larger states predominated and those of the smaller states bought off through side-payments in other policy areas. 19 However, earlier neofunctionalist frustrations with European foreign policy cooperation were quickly matched by those of intergovernmentalists. 20 In the early 1990s As EPC was replaced by the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and came to be strengthened and developed further, it became increasingly evident that European foreign policy cooperation appeared to play by its own rules. Member State interests were not the was introduced. However, if European integration theorists found themselves struggling to understand and explain the EU"s international persona, international relations" theorists were positively dumbfounded.
The European Union in International Relations
For many years, the EU simply did not appear on the horizons of international relations"
theorists -and for very good reason. The Union, as an international actor, simply could not be accommodated within a large section of orthodox theorising about the interstate system. The
European Community, and later the EU, challenged deeply instantiated and widely held assumptions. As a result, it could be argued that EU was "somehow beyond international relations" 21 The EU was not an actor in the inter-state drama and, at best, could only be accommodated as a vehicle of the post-imperial interests of the larger powers. Even with the arrival of liberal approaches to international relations, the EU was sandwiched together with other "new" actors such as multinational corporations and trans-national interest groups.
Moreover, it could still only be conceived of as an institutional illustration of cooperative problem solving among an enlightened set of state agents and actors, alongside the United Nations, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, for example. For realists and liberals alike then, the EU posed a fundamental paradox -it was not a state, yet was "state-like" in so much of its relations with states and the interstate system. Foreign policy could only be understood as a subset of state activity directed towards the outside world. If the theoretical drawbridge was lowered to accommodate the "foreign policy" of the EU, would not the same also have to hold true for the United Nations, for the Organisation for Economic Development and Co-operation, for the Association of Southeast Asian Nationsperhaps even for the Coca Cola company? And yet, if the theoretical rules were applied with rigour, how credible would it be to assess the impact and capacity of the foreign policies of up to 200 states in the international system and yet ignore the international impact of a political community that accounted for about one quarter of world trade and global wealth creation?
European integration has thus never fitted easily within a rationalist-dominated international theory. Indeed, neo-realists and neo-liberals share much more rationalist analytical territory than they dispute. One key example is the extent to which they both argue that power rests at the core of politics and that such power derives from the pursuit of individual material interest.
Another is that the range of questions open to analysts is precise, centring upon how interests are bargained and the processes of strategic decision-making that lies behind public policy choices. The comparative power of the rationalist approach and a partial explanation of its dominance is that it offers to the holders of power a precise and sparse account of their reality without opening uncomfortable doors into realms which draw their own positions into question. It also seems to relate more directly to "the facts" of international politics and because of the way in which it defines the world and inter-relationships within it, the approach often looks just like common sense.
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Certainly, when looking at the EU"s performance, particularly at times of crisis, the explanatory power of rationalist accounts is tremendously persuasive. of declared "national interests". It does, however, underline the degree to which national foreign policies are translated and formulated through a European context even before they hit an intergovernmental negotiating table.
34
Regarding the content of national foreign policies, there is also evidence of fundamental processes of change. These are illustrated by "a consequent internalisation of norms and expectations arising from a complex, collective policymaking system". 35 Hill and Wallace 36 define this process as one in which rationality is seen differently as a result of intensive exchange between officials. Earlier, Nuttall identified this as a "consultation reflex" in which officials sought out the views of colleagues before constructing their own analyses of the situation and possible policy responses. 37 The impact of this internalisation of beliefs and norms is that the content of national foreign policies have gradually shifted over time. While it is difficult to apply the ceteris paribus principle, analysts have identified such shifts for a range of states and over a range of issues.
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In the case of foreign policy expression, it is also evident that much has changed in recent years. The substantive reach of all but the largest Member State foreign ministry has also been broadened and many Member States are now involved in a much wider range of issues than heretofore. External actors expect the Union to have a response to international events and crises and EU Member States frequently justify their own policies by virtue of collective foreign policy endeavour. Member States have thus had to generate and defend positions that even 10 or 15 years ago they would not be expected to have held.
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In response to all of these challenges, a number of analysts have sought to "rethink" the EU"s foreign policy and to apply alternative approaches to the study of the EU"s global role. Some such approaches have sought to deconstruct state-centric views of world politics by shifting analysis away from how state-like the EU"s foreign policy is towards analysis of its 34 Tonra, Ben (2001) international "presence" 40 and "actorness". 41 These concepts are then used to link the internal workings of the EU across different functional policy areas with its overall impact on the external environment. The EU clearly acts internationally and even if it is not a fully-fledged actor. It is nonetheless necessary to consider its impact and how such action is politically derived within the EU. 42 It is also important to try and avoid looking at the EU as if it were "an incompetent state" 43 and instead to consider its real-world capacity to shape events outside its borders, both by its own volition and in response to third party expectations and demands.
When the focus of analysis moves from what sort of actor the EU is, to consideration of its attributes as an international actor, a range of analytical issues arise. One key issue identified is the "Capabilities-Expectations Gap" first outlined by Chris Hill. 44 In his article Hill compared and contrasted public expectations of what the EU was supposed to accomplish in the world with the means and capacities that Member States had actually bestowed upon it to achieve those ends. The comparison was unfavourable and the analysis identified a "gap" which implied that the EU was not an effective international actor. 45 Furthermore, this approach was especially well-equipped to deal with the EU"s evolution as an international actor, particularly as a collective foreign policy develops, because it was able to measure the ways in which "actorness" evolves over time. 46 The approach can be criticised, however, because it is still predicated upon a model of actorness similar to that of a state. Thus, if state foreign policy is the benchmark against which the EU"s international actorness is assessed, two logically consistent, but fundamentally opposed, conclusions could be drawn. The first is that the EU is on the road towards the construction of a state-like foreign policy -a "superpower" or "superstate" -which is then a matter of time, of political will and/or of institutional design. 47 Alternatively, it could argued that since the EU cannot and will never be a traditional state, it is condemned to a Sisyphus-like existence, with its system of intensive diplomatic coordination measured against a set of criteria it is condemned never to fulfil. 48 These alternatives remain, however, essentially rooted in a rationalist understanding of foreign policy and a largely positivist approach to social science. Two further alternatives move beyond these essentialist conceptions and posit an understanding of EU foreign policy that is perhaps more centrally rooted in identity and beliefs.
Considering Identity and Ideas
If the ideational foundations of foreign policy are to be taken seriously and the analyst is to move beyond seeing ideas either as "hooks" in the hands of individual utility maximisers, or as another set of parsimonious variables, then our conceptual horizons might be significantly broadened. At least one group of writers argue that the foundations of EU foreign policy can best be excavated using the archaeology of identity, rather than that of interests. 49 This constructivist approach offers a norm-based account of institutions that addresses many of the weaknesses of more instrumental, rationality-based models of a neo-liberal/neo-realist synthesis. The focus on beliefs, identity and norms, opens new pathways for analysing the EU"s international capacity. For example, it allows analysts to look at the growth and development of a "European" identity in foreign policy 50 and the role of public opinion and discourse in the creation of such an identity. 51 The analyst may also examine the implications of such a development for the creation of the EU as a normative actor driven by identity and values rather than interests. 52 The point of departure for such constructivist approaches is consideration of actors as role players rather than as rational utility maximisers. James March and Johan Olsen offer a conceptual model in which actors work to a "logic of appropriateness". 53 Within such, state actors (or agents) consider the context and expectations of the decision-making situations in which they find themselves and base their resulting decisions accordingly. That relationship, however, cannot presume any ontological primacy between agent and structure. While the actor"s identity and options for choice are shaped by the institutional structures that she inhabits, these self-same institutional structures exist and evolve as a result of their constitutive actors" identities and choices.
Thus, the conception of the EU"s foreign policy is not that of a forum within which state/actors" interests are bargained, but an environment from which a common foreign policy evolves and within which the interest/identity of actors/policymakers can be and often are shaped or even into one is explicitly presented as a means whereby the EU"s "voice" would have greater clarity and credibility. 56 ). This is also illustrated through the Lisbon Treaty"s proposed creation of a European External Action Service -which is again explicitly designed to offer a more coherent, effective and integrated interface between the Union and its Member States and the wider world.
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Important point: It would seem to me important to analyse the added-value of the Lisbon Treaty.
You can either add an extra section at the end of your article or deal with it at the end of each of your current section. What may be interesting is to apply your conceptual framework to the Lisbon Treaty and explain to the reader whether the new Treaty confirms your theoretical understanding of the EU.
Constructivism also offers a framework that improves our understanding of the centrality of very new contribution to understandings of international politics. Francois Duchêne argued that this new European polity was indeed a new construct in the international firmament. 59 It was a political entity with a powerful trade and economic identity, but a comparatively weak political/security structure. Thus, it might best be characterised as a new "civilian power" in international relations. His argument, however, was bigger than that, in as much as it also set out the thesis that this new "civilian power" might supplant traditional military power as the preferred means by which influence might be exercised in the modern world. 60 The thesis was hotly contested and disputed in a by now famous reply from Hedley Bull. 61 More recently, it has been taken up by scholars interested not so much in fact that the EU has an impact on the international system, but in the fact that the EU has a very unique impact and identity.
A number of writers have focussed on the very strong normative orientation of the EU"s international actions towards issues of international justice and human rights . 62 This, they argue, arises from the nature of the EU and the ways in which it acts as a normative exporter of values and beliefs. Manners and Whitman for example, move decisively away from analysis of the EU as an actor to that of the EU having an international identity that now allows the analyst to consider how the EU "is constituted, constructed and represented internationally". 63 . They insist that the EU"s international identity can only be successfully understood by employing both social and political theories, and conclude that it is necessary to move beyond essentialist, positivist and rationalist predispositions in order to look at the EU"s international identity as an ongoing "contestation of complex, multiple (and) relational identities". 64 They go on to characterise the EU as an open, pacific, principled, consensual, network characterised by an unconventional nature which is wholly unlike that of a traditional Westphalian state.
By focusing so intensively on the nature of the EU"s international identity, the pass is also opened to considerations of how that identity may then impact upon the international system. Certainly, the Lisbon Treaty again underscores the Union"s self-expressed dedication to a specified and very particular set of normative values. The treaty insists that in its foreign policy the Union will be "…guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, development and enlargement, and which it seeks to advance in the wider world: democracy, the rule of law, the universality and indivisibility of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for human dignity, the principles of equality and solidarity, and respect for the principles of the United Nations Charter and international law." Moreover, the substantive changes mooted by that treaty in the realm of foreign and security policy appear all to be directed towards a further strengthening of the Union"s integrated capacity to act -across a spectrum of mutually-reinforcing policy areas. At the same time, this does not attempt to reflect the capacities or structures of Member States. It neither creates an institutional primus inter pares among the Member States nor doe sit instantiate anything even remotely comparable to a federalised foreign and security policy making system. It attempts -through institutional development, policy integration and Member State volition -to create a sense of "we-feeling" that transcends a simple multinational association of shared interests and yet does not presuppose the creation of an overarching "European" identity.
The Military Dimension
Whether or not one accepts that the Union is a truly "different" international actor, it is certainly true to say that the Union"s development as an actor has been unique. Government has pledged up to 180 troops. Their participation, is however, contingent on UN authorisation of any mission to which the Battlegroup might be directed. 67 Tonra, Ben (2001) op cit. 68 The Petersberg tasks were originally adopted in June 1992 at a ministerial council of the Western European Union (WEU) held at the Petersberg Hotel, Germany. These tasks were subsequently adopted by the EU and are specified in Article 17 of the EU Treaty as defining the content of the EU"s security and defence policy. Within that policy, military units of the EU Member States may be employed for: Humanitarian and rescue tasks; Peacekeeping tasks; Tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking. what is the logic in clinging to ever more abstruse definitions of a "civilian power" when the one clear, obvious and specific indicator of civilian-ness (i.e. the absence of a military capacity) has been breached? The death of civilian power EU may be regretted but it may also be regarded as being "definitively dead".
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The question that then arises is what difference the "militarisation" of the Union makes to the nature and substance of EU power and its exercise? For some, the Union can now be placed within traditional inter state power structures and it is simply then a matter of assessing the Union"s international capacity alongside any number of historical or contemporary precedents.
The Union is thus no longer different in any meaningful sense. This can then open one of two avenues in a rationalist critique that centres on an explanation of the Union is a power-seeking and interest-pursuing entity. The first might be described as a traditional rationalist left-wing critique of the Union -that it is a neo-imperial, acquisitive, capitalist enterprise bent on the exploitation of the developing world and other less powerful interests in pursuit of its rentseeking aspirations. The second might be described as a traditional rationalist right-wing critique of the Union -that is a soft, pacifist, self obsessed and overbearingly smug international actor which exploits a free-ride for its own defense provided by the United In sum, therefore, perhaps the Union"s militarization -the extension of the Union"s foreign and security policy capacity to encompass military and defence issues -is simply part and parcel of a broader, identity-driven process of Europeanisation? Certainly, this is illustrated by the provisions of the Lisbon Treaty, which in the security and defence realm, provide the legal underpinnings for an already complex and sophisticated institutional system. The Union does not provide for a mutual security guarantee, nor does it establish itself as any kind of military alliance structure. At root, the "progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence" is pitched precisely as a process directed towards identityconstruction and "we-feeling". 74 It aspires to mutual solidarity and the development of a political reflex that is both self-referential to the Union as whole as well as the obligations of shared interests and purpose.
The European Union as an Enlightened Power?
It is the argument of this paper that the Union is neither a complex international institution, nor a state-in-the-making. It represents a new departure in international relations -one that is 74 Article 10C provides that "The Union's competence in matters of common foreign and security policy shall cover all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common defence policy that might lead to a common defence."
uniquely conditioned by a very particular set of capacities and an ambition which exceeds the pursuit of collective self interest and which instead aspires to systemic transformation. This, based also on its very unique legal and institutional structures creates of the Union a potentially "enlightened power".
Ian Manners has offered a conceptualization of the European Union as a "Normative Power"
in which the Union"s capacity and ambition to shape conceptions of the "normal" in international relations is headlined 75 . He argues that the Union"s normativity leads it to pursue milieu goals rather than possession goals i.e. the redesign of the international system as a whole rather than the pursuit of short-term immediate self-interests. 76 Manner"s thesis is supported by an analysis of the Union"s normative scope, which -at least on the face of it -is much broader than other actors. It lays claim not just to the promotion and instantiation of democracy and human rights but also wider social rights, sustainable development, global solidarity and good governance. The Union"s capacity to diffuse such ambitious normative aspiration is also aided by the fact that the Union can pose no physical threat. As a result, according to Manners, the "EU can be conceptualized as a changer of norms in the However, can this claim for the Union"s focus on norms over interests be sustained? Certainly, as highlighted by Sjursen there is within the literature a broad recognition that EU foreign and security policy is seen to be animated by powerful ambitions not simply to act coherently but to act in the right way. 78 This has recently been underlined in work on the enlargement of the Union, wherein it has been highlighted that the Union sold its own interests short in its ambition to fulfil what its key policy makers -at both EU and Member State level -saw to be their historic obligation to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. 79 This is not to say that the Union is in any way blind to self-interest, simply that in its pursuit of its own declared norms, values and beliefs, it creates in itself and among the relevant policy makers a sense of shared mission and identity which both tempers the substance of -by virtue of the Union"s relationship with its own Member States. Union institutions and actors are consistently seeking to ameliorate, adjudicate and coalesce the declared "interests" of the constituent Member States into some common shared position. They are, as result, so acculturated against the concept of "interest" that they tend to reinvent particular interests as general principle and to then pursue same as general norms, universally applicable. This offers some understanding as to why the focus on Union policy makers is so consistently bent towards the expression of norms, beliefs and values presented by the Union as generalisable and universal. Even so, however, how far can the Union really be distinguished from other international actors in that regard? Are we not aware of other major international actors that take the nationally particular and then glibly universalise its applicability?
Certainly, there is a long and powerful normative tradition in US foreign and security policy.
Whether it is inter-war Wilsonianism, the Détente-inspired Human Rights policy of Jimmy
Carter or the post Cold War"s new world order conceived of by George Bush père, US policy has long had a penchant for the export of domestic norms. How then can the Union be contrasted with such an example?
According to Sjursen, this can be accomplished on two grounds: first through an appreciation and recognition of and positive engagement with, situational context and second through a reliance on soft as opposed to hard power. 80 The former is illustrated by something of a foreign policy cliché; the presumed European disposition towards compromise, bargained outcomes and ambiguity as against US foreign policy absolutism and determinism. Thus, the normative credentials of US policymakers are undermined by the external perception that the US is simply seeking to impose itself and replicate itself in the world, rather than engaging with the historic, political or cultural sensitivities involved. The second level of differentiation is that of policy pursuit. Again, at last partly by function of having the capacity successfully to employ hard power (i.e. the power of carrots and sticks) the United State"s pursuit of what it claims to be universal norms is further undermined by the alacrity with which it employs such hard power to secure acquiescence. By contrast, and again partly or largely due to its comparative lack of hard power capacity, the Union"s normative credentials are only strengthened by the fact that it relies more on the soft power of illustration, example and exhortation than on explicit conditionality and other hard power. As Kagan puts it "Europe brings a unique kind of power, not coercive military power but the power of attraction. The
European Union has become a gigantic political and economic magnet whose greatest Despite the aforementioned weaknesses and lacunae, the European Union remains unique as an international actor in several other respects which, together with the (qualified) normative ambitions and capacity outlined above, does give substance to the potential idea of the Union as an "Enlightened" power. In his book "The Conditions of Peace" E.H. Carr insisted that peace in Europe could only be guaranteed when Europeans were finally prepared to "determine themselves into different units for different purposes" and to establish among themselves a "wider form of international community". 83 If successful, this model might then be recognised by the rest of the world as a model. Carr"s idealised "New Europe" bears an uncanny resemblance to the contemporary European Union with its critically important and all-encompassing "moral (or normative) purpose", 84 the subordination of national interests to the collective good, 85 and an institutional structure that defended common interests and which contributed to the creation of "new loyalties" and a new collective European identity. 
Conclusion
The Union"s international capacity continues to be an issue of fascination for analysts both of European integration and of International Relations. As we have seen above, neither field has fully nor comfortably been able to place the development of the Union"s global power within the neat boxes of their respective typologies or theories. At the same time, in struggling to accommodate the Union, analysts have identified certain elements which mark the Union as being, if not unique, then certainly exceptional. There is little doubt but that on the face of it, the Union has acquired -or is in the process of acquiring -many of the traditional trappings of a state-like foreign, security and defence policy: from a politically accountable foreign minister-type appointee, to the organisation of troops on common, agreed military missions.
Within the transformation outlined above, the addition of a military capacity to the EU"s foreign and security policy and the effective end of the EU as an exclusively "civilian power"
is especially significant. However, the analysis of this article would argue that the Union remains sufficiently unique and/or exceptional as to rule out its decisive movement towards becoming a traditional Westphalian State. Whether that differentiation is rooted in its decision making procedures and structures, its institutional design, its alleged normative ambitions, its impact on Member States" foreign and security policy and policy makers or
